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Math and Science Education 
 
I would like to expand a little on Lauren B. Res-
nick’s article “Mathematics and science learning: A 
new conception” (29 Apr., p. 477) on the basis of my 
own experience teaching geophysics at the university 
level. Geophysics is a field in which the qualitative 
aspects of science that she discusses are perhaps 
more obvious and accessible than in older, more pre-
cise disciplines, such as physics. My 8 years of teach-
ing have taught me that my two greatest challenges 
are students’ inexperience with problem solving and 
with verbal expression of a scientific problem. I see 
these as closely related and as a symptom of the 
broader deficiencies in literacy and numeracy in stu-
dents today. 
The first deficiency, inexperience with problem-
solving, is manifest in the persistent tendency to grab 
the nearest formula and start substituting numbers 
without first considering its relevance to the problem 
at hand. At a more advanced level, it is manifest in a 
reluctance to do first some “back-of-the-envelope” 
estimates before launching into a calculation that may 
be more elaborate than the problem demands. The 
engineering and physics majors in my classes, evi-
dently having been drilled in applied mathematics 
methods, are more prone to this. It is also a wide-
spread tendency in the research literature (and is 
probably abetted, in this context, by the desire to im-
press the audience with mathematical machismo). 
This much accords closely with Resnick’s comments; 
in more old-fashioned terms, we might say that these 
students have not been forced to think enough about 
their scientific problems. 
The second deficiency, in verbal expression, goes 
further. In order that my students appreciate the ob-
servational and logical basis of scientific inferences, I 
have had them write brief essays defending some 
hypothesis (for example, that the earth has a liquid 
metallic core). While most students have learned to 
do these reasonably well, it has usually been their 
first experience of such writing, and the shortcomings 
of a few have been illuminating. Some do not have a 
clear understanding of the difference between theory 
and evidence: cause and effect are confused. Many 
have difficulty organizing the material, and often the 
writing is wordy. The worst cases (these are college 
juniors and seniors) are essentially illiterate: their 
writing is ungrammatical and totally disorganized, 
although many of the relevant words and phrases 
might be present. I have concluded that these students 
have not been forced to think much about anything, 
be it science, history, or poetry. (Nevertheless, they 
often go on to graduate.)  
I strongly agree with Resnick’s suggestion that 
“teaching has to focus [more] on the qualitative as-
pects of scientific and mathematical problem situa-
tions” (my insertion). It is tempting in science classes 
to try to race through all of the topics that might be 
included in a given subject, but it is much better in-
stead to be selective and to go carefully over the rele-
vant observations and the comparison of these with 
deductions from various hypotheses. Quantitative 
problems may give practice only in the deductive 
phase of science; writing assignments expose stu-
dents to the inductive phase and to the winnowing of 
rival hypotheses.  
We might even find that, with more emphasis on 
qualitative aspects of science, the gulf between the 
“two cultures” will disappear. Scientists and engi-
neers might become more literate, while nonscientists 
might realize that science is more than the dry recita-
tion of “facts” and “laws” and begin actively to ap-
preciate it as an integral part of our culture. After all, 
as Resnick’s comments suggest, we will get through 
life on the basis of a complex of “naïve” theories 
about how the world works.  
 
GEOFFREY F. DAVIES 
Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences 
Washington University 
St. Louis, Missouri 63130 
Resnick provides an excellent brief account of 
current work in cognitive psychology and its impor-
tant implications for math and science education. As 
she indicates, most cognitive psychologists view 
knowledge as consisting of highly organized sche-
mata into which new experiences are assimilated and 
view the learner as actively constructing new knowl-
edge. This view is consistent with the ideas that Pia-
getian theorists and educators have been propounding 
for many years, although Resnick’s discussion is 
rooted in the more detailed analysis of specific 
knowledge and learning in specific content areas that 
typifies the information-processing paradigm of 
modern cognitive science.  
Unfortunately, although Resnick may not have in-
tended this, her article can be read as suggesting that 
the self-constructed theories children bring to their 
science classes are, on the whole, naïve and inappro-
priate views that must be replaced by more adequate 
scientific conceptions and that may hinder students in 
learning the latter. Although children undoubtedly do 
bring some incorrect preconceptions to their science 
classes, it should be emphasized that they also bring a 
wealth of crucial mathematical and scientific intui-
tions (for example, basic conceptions of speed, cau-
sality, transitive relations, and so forth) that they have 
constructed over the years and without which mean-
ingful assimilation of the content of those classes 
would be impossible. Thus, the fact that classroom 
experiences are naturally assimilated into children’s 
prior understandings is not so much a hindrance to 
learning accurate science as a basic phenomenon of 
cognition that makes learning possible at all and that 
educators should use to maximum advantage.  
 
DAVID MOSHMAN 
Department of Educational Psychology,  
University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is a pleasure to reply to letters such as Davies’ 
and Moshman’s because their comments provide 
some of the elaboration and argument that were not 
possible in my brief essay. I am especially intrigued 
by Davies’ suggestion that the processes of reasoning 
in the sciences and in more humanistic disciplines 
may turn out to be more similar than is often sup-
posed. Cognitive research in language understanding 
and production is indeed suggesting that processes 
that have much in common with qualitative analysis 
in the sciences play a role in comprehending and 
writing complex texts of various kinds. Nevertheless, 
there is also evidence that the specific kinds of 
knowledge that people have affects the form of their 
reasoning. This means that, if reasoning can be 
taught, it can probably only be done in the context of 
specific domains of knowledge. Whether such do-
main-specific learning will in turn produce improved 
reasoning and expression in other domains remains to 
be seen, but I agree with Davies that there is room for 
cautious optimism.  
Moshman’s suggestion that children’s intuitions 
and invented theories may be the very stuff out of 
which scientific competence can be built raises a cen-
tral question for a cognitive theory of learning. At 
present, we do not know exactly what role invented 
theories play in learning. We know only that such 
inventions are virtually unavoidable and that invented 
theories are sometimes in fundamental conflict with 
scientific ones. We do not yet know much about the 
cognitive processes involved in modifying one’s 
theories or in building new ones. Nor do we know 
whether typical invented theories are necessary steps 
on the way to scientific ones or just the result of gaps 
in experience and knowledge. We cannot say, there-
fore, exactly how invented theories should best be 
treated in the classroom.  
These are the kinds of questions that can be an-
swered only by the kind of continuing research in 
mathematical and scientific cognition that was advo-
cated in my article.  
 
LAUREN B. RESNICK 
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